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Abstract
Background: When outbreak detection algorithms (ODAs) are considered individually, the task of outbreak
detection can be seen as a classification problem and the ODA as a sensor providing a binary decision (outbreak
yes or no) for each day of surveillance. When they are considered jointly (in cases where several ODAs analyze the
same surveillance signal), the outbreak detection problem should be treated as a decision fusion (DF) problem of
multiple sensors.
Methods: This study evaluated the benefit for a decisions support system of using DF methods (fusing multiple
ODA decisions) compared to using a single method of outbreak detection. For each day, we merged the decisions
of six ODAs using 5 DF methods (two voting methods, logistic regression, CART and Bayesian network - BN).
Classical metrics of accuracy, prediction and timelines were used during the evaluation steps.
Results: In our results, we observed the greatest gain (77%) in positive predictive value compared to the best ODA
if we used DF methods with a learning step (BN, logistic regression, and CART).
Conclusions: To identify disease outbreaks in systems using several ODAs to analyze surveillance data, we
recommend using a DF method based on a Bayesian network. This method is at least equivalent to the best of the
algorithms considered, regardless of the situation faced by the system. For those less familiar with this kind of
technique, we propose that logistic regression be used when a training dataset is available.
Keywords: Decision support system, Disease surveillance system, Decision making, Decision fusion, Outbreak
detection, Bayesian network
Background
The task of outbreak detection can be considered as a
classification problem, and outbreak detection algo-
rithms (ODAs) can be viewed as classifiers or sensors
providing a binary decision (outbreak yes or no) for each
time step of surveillance. For specialists in charge of a
disease surveillance system, with more than 120 ODAs
published [1] and in the absence of a consensus among
specialists, the task of choosing the best ODA remains
an highly complex one [2, 3]. Indeed ODA performance
depends on several characteristics associated with the
outbreak curve (shape, duration and size), the baseline
(mean, variance) [4, 5] and their relationships (signal-
to-noise ratio, signal-to-noise difference) [6, 7]. In this
context, the hope of having a single algorithm that
would be efficient enough to detect all outbreaks in all
situations faced by a disease surveillance system is prob-
ably illusory.
For that reason, certain teams in charge of disease/
syndromic surveillance systems choose to work with
several ODAs to analyze the same surveillance dataset
[8] as a multisensor system [9] with the objective of
being able to produce correct decisions with a given
amount of input information. Even if multiple sensors
provide significantly more information on which to base
a decision than a single sensor, using multiple classifiers
or sensors can lead to several issues. Among them, as
detailed in [9, 10], we can cite data conflict (agreement
between classifier decisions), uncertainty, correlation,
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imprecision, incompleteness…, all of which makes deci-
sion fusion (DF) a challenging task. Finally, all these
problems call into question the true benefit of using
multiple ODAs for decision-making.
If we consider ODA decisions as a whole, the outbreak
detection problem should be treated as a decision fusion
problem of multiple classifiers/sensors. Decision fusion
methods are tailored to generate a single decision, from
multiple classifiers or biometric sensor decisions [11].
Fusion also provides the advantage of compensating for
the deficiencies of one sensor by using one or more add-
itional sensors. Moreover, in the context of surveillance,
most of these techniques are automatable and can be
added to the decision support system integrated in a
disease surveillance system.
There are numerous publications on fusion methods
for outbreak detection focused on the fusion of data
collected from multiple streams [12–17] using different
methods, such as Bayesian Networks, to manage differ-
ent sources of data potentially useable in surveillance.
However, to our knowledge, only one work [18] describes
a decision fusion method applied to a single data stream.
This study used an approach to enhance the classifier
structure and yielded ambivalent results, according to the
authors. The study’s limitations and the conceptual frame-
work of Dietterich’s reasons (statistical, computational and
representational) [19], justifying why multiple classifiers
may work better than a single one, suggest the necessity
of new studies in this field.
With the aim of improving decision making for disease
surveillance system users, we propose to evaluate the
benefit of using DF methods fusing multiple ODA deci-
sions versus using a single method of outbreak detection.
This study is a proof of concept that aims at evaluating
the capabilities of DF methods to enhance the reliability
of outbreak detection systems. For this purpose, we will
use synthetic data for controlling the outbreak curve
characteristics in place of real data, which don’t allow
the experimental controls required for this study.
Methods
Datasets
Evaluation
In the lack of a consensual gold standard allowing the de-
lineation of a real outbreak within a disease surveillance
series [7], the necessity to control precisely the onset and
the end of the outbreak signal and finally to obtain a
sufficient sample size to allow an adequate evaluation, we
choose, as several authors (Buckeridge, Jackson..), to use
synthetic data. A more complete discussion on this subject
can be found in Texier and al [20].
The simulated data sets were generated according to
approaches already detailed in previous studies [4, 7, 20].
Each simulated dataset was generated by combining two
components: a baseline and outbreak signals. In this
work, given a minimum outbreak spacing of 15 days
between two outbreaks, the outbreak signals were ran-
domly superimposed on baseline data in order to respect
10 ± 1% of the prevalence of outbreak days over 20 years.
Five levels of baseline were generated, corresponding to
the expected daily incidences of 1, 3, 5, 10 and 30 cases
per day. Based on a real outbreak of Norovirus which
had already been published [21], we used a resampling
method [4, 7, 20], to generate curves with four different
outbreak magnitudes (10, 30, 50 and 100 cases) and with
a same duration of 12 days, corresponding to the dur-
ation of the originating real outbreak. Depending on the
influence of the curve shape on ODA evaluation results,
we considered that the use of resampling methods for
generating our epidemic curves was the most realistic
(see on this topic [20]). Twenty evaluation datasets (cor-
responding to the different combinations of the 5 levels
of baseline with the 4 levels of outbreak magnitudes)
were produced. We calculated the sample size required
to estimate our evaluation metrics (as the sensitivity de-
fined by Jafarpour [22]) with a specified level of confidence
and precision (with a maximal error allowed of 3%). To
reach this objective of precision, each algorithm had to
evaluate 1100 outbreaks during this study. Finally, our
evaluation datasets corresponded to 146,000 simulated
days of surveillance that were evaluated by each sensor.
Training
For methods requiring a learning period, we simulated
data with a 5-year surveillance period. Training and
evaluation datasets were generated independently but
had similar characteristics in terms of baseline level,
outbreak size, and prevalence. We used exactly the same
training dataset for all the learning methods.
Outbreak detection algorithms
In this study, we used a set of six outbreak detection
algorithms frequently used in routine disease surveillance
systems [8], for which several statistical packages [23] are
available and which are easily implementable. We chose
the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) chart as proposed by
Rossi [24], the C-family of detection algorithms (C1, C2,
and C3), which are adaptive algorithms included in the
Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS) developed by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
[25], the Exponential Weighted Moving Average algo-
rithms (EWMA) [6], and the Farrington algorithm, which
should be applicable to various types of infections [26].
Decision fusion methods (DFMs)
Taxonomy and choice
Fusion of data/information can be carried out on three
levels of abstraction: data fusion, feature fusion, and
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classifier fusion (also referred to as decision fusion or
mixture of experts) [27]. Due to the large number of
classifier fusion methods in the literature, we decided to
base our choice of methods on a taxonomy of these
techniques proposed by Ruta [28]. Based on individual
classifier outputs, Ruta identified two main approaches
to combining classifiers, namely classifier selection (or
structure optimization) and classifier fusion. The first
approach looks for the single best classifier or a selected
group of classifiers and uses only their outputs to build a
final decision or for further processing.
The second approach focuses on classifier outputs and
combines those outputs. According to the characteristics
of the combined outputs, several authors have identified
three levels of aggregation [28–30]:
 The measurement level: A classifier attributes a
probability value to each label
 The rank level: A classifier ranks all labels in a
queue and chooses the top label
 The abstract level (or single class label): A classifier
only generates a single-label output (in our case,
outbreak yes or no).
These three levels form an information gradient where
the measurement level contains the most information
and the abstract level contains the least [30].
We selected two simple and intuitive methods from
the abstract level: the majority voting scheme and the
weighted voting scheme.
The second level aims at reordering a class set. Logis-
tic regression methods, which are situated at this level
and are well known to epidemiologists, assign a weight
to each classifier reflecting its importance in an efficient
multiple sensor system. In this category, we also selected
the CART Method [31].
The largest group of classifier fusion methods associ-
ated with the measurement level produces output values
in the [0–1] range. These values cover all known
measures of evidence (probability, possibility, necessity,
belief, and plausibility) and are tailored to quantify a
level of uncertainty. Indeed, all the fusion methods in
this group try to reduce the level of uncertainty by maxi-
mizing a measure of evidence [28]. From this group, we
selected the Bayesian Belief Networks method. A brief
synopsis on each decision fusion method chosen is
provided below.
Voting methods
The simplest way to combine the decisions of multiple
outbreak detection algorithms is by voting, which corre-
sponds to performing a linear combination of the pre-
diction results of the algorithms. In the case of majority
voting (MV) scheme fusion, the method gives equal
weight to the decisions and carries out the prediction
with the highest number of votes as the result. Weighted
majority voting (WMV) stems from relaxing the as-
sumption about equal individual accuracies. We choose
area under the ROC Curve to weight the vote. Indeed,
the AUC, which is based on both sensitivity and specifi-
city, can be considered as a relevant indicator of
algorithm performance to weight the vote, increasing
the participation of decision with high sensitivity and
specificity.
The reader is referred to Rahman et al. [32] for a com-
prehensive examination of the subject.
Logistic regression
The logistic regression model relates the conditional prob-
ability of an event distributed as a binomial Y according to
a weighted combination of values for variables such as
X1,X2,…,Xn which represent the decision of each outbreak
detection algorithm (suppose j(1 ≤ j ≤ n) then Xj = 1 or
Xj = 0) [33]. Y is the response variable corresponding to
the true value for outbreak generated in the simulated
data, while the various X’s, usually called explanatory vari-
ables, are ODAs. As for the weighted voting scheme, logis-
tic regression can be seen as a linear combination (y = ß1
X1 + ß2 X2 +… + ßi Xi) of ODA decisions Xi weigthed by
an estimated coefficient ßi. To estimate the model coeffi-
cients (ßi), the logistic regression was run on the training
dataset. The selection of the final model in the training
step was based on the lowest Akaike Information Criter-
ion (AIC). In the end, the model selected was used on the
simulated data having a 20-year surveillance period. On
any given day, the results of the ODAs provide a predicted
value of Y, representing the probability of an outbreak on
that day. If this predicted probability exceeds 0.5, we
classify the day as an outbreak day.
Classification and regression trees (CART)
CART is a classification method that has been success-
fully used in many health care applications [34]. Al-
though there are variants of tree-based methods with
different splitting criteria, CART was selected for this
study, since it is used in decision fusion [35]. The reader
is directed to Breiman [36] for a comprehensive descrip-
tion of the CART algorithm.
The six decisions of the ODA are used as independent
variables in our CART model. As with logistic regres-
sion, the training data sets were used for the construc-
tion of maximum tree and for the choice of the right
tree size. The rpart package of R software was used for
the implementation of the CART model [37].
Bayesian networks (BNs)
Bayesian Networks (BNs) belong to the family of di-
rected acyclic graph models. The network structure can
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be described as follows: Each node in the graph represents
a binary variable provided by each classifier (i.e. ODA),
while the edges between the nodes represent probabilistic
dependencies among the corresponding variables.
As with the two previous DF methods (logistic regres-
sion and CART), the dataset generated during a 5-year
surveillance period was used to train the BN. The
bnlearn R package [38, 39] and Netica [40] were used to
implement the BN. To validate the Bayesian network
structure from our data, we used the Hill Climbing algo-
rithm based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
score. An estimated probability of epidemic presence is
provided by the BN and a probability threshold of 50%
was selected to classify the outbreak presence/absence
status for a given day, as in logistic regression.
Evaluation metrics
We evaluated the performance metrics using several
criteria: accuracy, prediction quality, and timeliness of out-
break detection. Accuracy was assessed by the specificity
(Sp), the sensitivity (Se), and the area under the ROC (Re-
ceiver Operating Characteristic) curve (AUC) [22]. Two var-
iants of Se were calculated in the paper: Se per day, which is
the probability of correctly classifying outbreak days, and Se
per outbreak, which is the ability to detect at least one out-
break day over the entire duration of the outbreak.
The evaluation of the quality of predictions was done
using positive and negative predictive values (PPV and
NPV respectively). The timeliness of outbreak detection
was evaluated using the time to detection, the proportion
of cases required for outbreak detection, the weighted
AUC and the area under the Activity Monitor Operating
Characteristic (AMOC) curve. The time to detection was
defined as the mean and median number of days from the
beginning of each outbreak to the first alarm during the
outbreak. The proportion of cases required for outbreak
detection was defined as the number of cases already oc-
curring by the moment of detection divided by the total
number of cases in the outbreak. This quantity can be
seen as the minimal number of outbreak cases required
for outbreak detection. The area under weighted ROC
(AUWROC) is an ROC curve in which each point of the
curve is weighted by a timeliness measure [41] and the
area under the AMOC curve represents the relationship
between the timeliness of outbreak detection and the false
alarm rate (1-Specificity) [42]. A timeliness score defined
as the proportion of time saved by detection relative to an
outbreak onset, was also calculated as follows:
Timeliness score ¼ 1− time detection−time onset
Outbreak duration
where outbreak duration is the total outbreak length in
days, time detection is the index of the day within the
time series when the outbreak is detected and time onset
is the index of the day on which outbreak starts [22].
The timeliness score is 1 if the outbreak is detected on
the first day of occurrence and 0 when the outbreak is
not detected [6].
We also assessed the influence of the outbreak and
baseline characteristics on the performance metrics of
the ODAs and the DF methods. As defined in a previous
study, the signal-to-noise difference (SND) was used for
this evaluation [7]. In practice, three scenarios corre-
sponding to three values of SND were considered: posi-
tive, quasi-null and negative SND. A positive SND
corresponds to a higher number of cases in the outbreak
than in the baseline during the outbreak period, and a
negative SND to the opposite.
All algorithms, DF methods, and analyses were imple-
mented with R software 3.3.0 [23] using the following
packages: surveillance (for most algorithms), qcc (for
EWMA), flux (for the estimations of AUCs), rpart and
rpart.plot (for CART), bnlearn (Bayesian Networks).
Results
Accuracy and quality of prediction assessment
Table 1 summarizes the performance metrics of accuracy
for six ODA and five DFM in terms of detection sensitivity
per outbreak or per day, specificity, PPV, NPV and AUC.
The six outbreak detection algorithms had a detection
sensitivity per outbreak ranging from 72 to 89%, with the
lowest for the C1 algorithm and the highest for the
EWMA algorithm. The implementation of DFM showed
that voting methods provided detection sensitivities per
outbreak [78 to 82%], close to those of CUSUM, C3 or
Farrington while other DFMs such as logistic regression,
CART, or BN, had on average a detection sensitivity per
outbreak lower than the range indicated above. The detec-
tion sensitivity per day varied strongly from 10 to 45% for
the ODAs. This metric was more stable among the DFM,
as it varied only from to 23 to 27%.
Concerning the quality of outbreak prediction, PPVs
were ranged from 36 to 51% for the outbreak detection
algorithms, and was higher for the five DFMs starting at
61% and reaching more than 90% for the three DFMs
using a learning step (logistic regression, CART, or
Bayesian networks). Thus, when the best algorithm had
one chance in two to correctly predict the outbreak sta-
tus for a given day, the best fusion methods had nine
out of ten chances not to be mistaken. However, NPVs
were almost identical between the outbreak detection
algorithms and the fusion methods.
Our evaluation results show that the three DFMs
using a learning step yielded overall accuracies that were
quite close to that found for CUSUM, which consistently
provided the highest accuracy (AUC =73%) among out-
break detection algorithms (see Fig. 1).
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Table 1 Performance metrics for the accuracy and prediction quality of the outbreak detection algorithms and the decision fusion
methods
Sensitivity per outbreak Sensitivity per day Specificity PPV NPV AUC
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
CUSUM 0.83 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.87 0.17 0.49 0.35 0.94 0.03 0.73 0.14
C1 0.72 0.34 0.10 0.07 0.99 0.00 0.38 0.21 0.92 0.01 0.53 0.02
C2 0.74 0.33 0.16 0.11 0.99 0.00 0.45 0.23 0.92 0.01 0.57 0.04
C3 0.82 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.96 0.00 0.36 0.16 0.93 0.01 0.62 0.07
Farrington 0.86 0.20 0.20 0.11 0.97 0.02 0.51 0.33 0.92 0.01 0.66 0.10
EWMA 0.89 0.20 0.29 0.17 0.95 0.02 0.37 0.20 0.93 0.02 0.64 0.09
Majority voting 0.82 0.26 0.24 0.17 0.99 0.01 0.61 0.32 0.93 0.02 0.60 0.09
Weighted majority voting 0.78 0.31 0.23 0.17 0.99 0.01 0.66 0.33 0.93 0.02 0.61 0.08
Logistic regression 0.65 0.44 0.27 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.90 0.06 0.93 0.02 0.70 0.12
CARTa 0.65 0.44 0.26 0.24 1.00 0.00 0.91 0.07 0.93 0.02 0.69 0.12
Bayesian Networks 0.66 0.43 0.26 0.24 1.00 0.00 0.90 0.09 0.93 0.02 0.70 0.12
aCART Classification and Regression Trees, PPV Positive Predictive Values, NPV Negative Predictive Values, AUC Area Under the ROC (Receiver Operating
Characteristic) Curve, STD Standard Deviation
Fig. 1 Accuracy measured by area under curve (AUC) according to outbreak detection algorithm and decision fusion method
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Timeliness assessment
Timeliness is a key metric for early warning surveillance
systems. It refers to the ability of the detection algorithm
to detect a signal aberration early enough to enable
public health authorities to respond rapidly. Among the
outbreak detection algorithms, the best timeliness was
achieved by the EWMA algorithm (cases required = 41%,
time to detection = 5.28, proportion of delay = 38%)
[Table 2]. For the DFMs, the simplest react the most
rapidly. In general, fusion methods were slightly slower
than detection algorithms. But when we weighted timeli-
ness by integrating accuracy metrics to reflect the fact
that a rapid false alarm is of relatively little value, DFMs
produced similar results, in terms of AMOC or
AUWROC, to that provided by the CUSUM algorithm,
which was the fastest detection algorithm.
The influence of signal-to-noise difference on outbreak
detection performance
From our results, it is clear that the SND has a direct
impact on the timeliness and the capacity of outbreak
detection, whatever method was used. Firstly, when the
outbreak signal is easy to detect among the baseline
noise, the best performance in terms of detection is pro-
vided by the Farrington algorithm (Specificity = 100%,
PPV = 99%, NPV = 95%, AUWROC = 79%) [Table 3].
Overall, fusion methods seem to perform at the same
level as the best ODA when SND is positive. It should
be noted that when the SND tends towards zero, fusion
methods even seem to provide a slight improvement
over ODAs. Then, when the outbreak signal is more
difficult to detect among the baseline noise, the best
performance in terms of detection is provided by the
CUSUM algorithm (PPV = 96%, NPV = 91%, AUWROC=
59%) but when timeliness is considered more important
than PPV, EWMA (time to detection = 5, proportion of
delay = 37%, AUWROC= 54%) and the Farrington algo-
rithm (time to detection = 5, proportion of delay = 55%,
AUWROC= 56%), can be considered as a good com-
promise that comes at the price of a high rate of false
alarms when the SND is negative (PPV = 25 to 46%).
Discussion
Evaluation of decision fusion
Majority voting
The voting method is the simplest DF method to imple-
ment, since it doesn’t require a priori knowledge. What-
ever the situation, to guarantee the best results for the
voting method, it is better to use an odd number of
independent ODAs [43]. The main qualities of this
method are probably its timeliness (with only 49% of
total number of outbreak cases required on average
before a detection and a proportion of delay = 0.44) with
a detection occurring on average 5.3 days after the onset
of the outbreak, with relatively good performance as
long as the SND remains positive. Another advantage is
its simplicity of implementation and the possibility of
changing the decision rule with the aim of optimizing
detection. Here, we chose a majority voting decision
rule, but others exist, such as Byzantine, unanimity, or
m-out-of n voting rules [44].
Theoretically promising compared to the above tech-
nique (by overweighting the most efficient ODA),
Weighted majority voting ultimately suffers from the
limitations of voting methods without the advantage in
terms of reactivity offered by the simple voting method.
Xu [29], and several authors have compared this ap-
proach to other DF methods and find that this method
usually underperforms, as it did in our study.
Table 2 Performance metrics for the timeliness of outbreak detection of the detection algorithms and decision fusion methods
Cases required Proportion of delay Time to detection AMOC AUWROC
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
CUSUM 0.47 0.24 0.41 0.20 5.10 2.83 0.83 0.05 0.66 0.11
C1 0.54 0.27 0.49 0.23 6.50 3.44 0.87 0.03 0.50 0.03
C2 0.52 0.27 0.48 0.23 5.90 3.09 0.86 0.03 0.54 0.05
C3 0.56 0.18 0.46 0.16 6.30 2.64 0.82 0.04 0.56 0.07
Farrington 0.46 0.17 0.41 0.14 5.23 2.26 0.87 0.04 0.61 0.10
EWMA 0.41 0.19 0.38 0.14 5.28 2.45 0.87 0.03 0.59 0.08
Majority voting 0.49 0.22 0.44 0.18 5.30 2.56 0.75 0.11 0.57 0.07
Weighted majority voting 0.53 0.24 0.47 0.20 5.43 2.54 0.75 0.11 0.57 0.07
Logistic regression 0.59 0.31 0.56 0.30 7.15 3.82 0.82 0.07 0.63 0.10
CARTa 0.60 0.30 0.57 0.30 7.10 3.85 0.77 0.12 0.62 0.09
Bayesian networks 0.60 0.30 0.56 0.29 6.75 3.55 0.81 0.09 0.63 0.11
aCART Classification and Regression Trees, Cases required proportion of cases needed for outbreak detection, Proportion of delay = 1 – timeliness score, that is: 1-
(sum of time to detection) / outbreak duration, AMOC Activity Monitor Operating Characteristic, AUWROC Area Under Weighted ROC, STD Standard Deviation
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Table 3 Influence of signal-to-noise difference (SND) characteristics on the performance metrics of the detection algorithms and the
fusion methods
Sensitivity
per outbreak
Sensitivity
per day
Specificity PPV NPV Cases
required
Proportion
of delay
Time to
detection
AUC AMOC AUWROC
Positive SND: scenario with a SND = 65.4
CUSUM 1 0.74 0.83 0.29 0.97 0.17 0.25 4 0.89 0.90 0.81
C1 1 0.25 0.99 0.69 0.93 0.08 0.15 2 0.59 0.92 0.57
C2 1 0.38 0.99 0.77 0.94 0.08 0.14 2 0.66 0.92 0.64
C3 1 0.54 0.96 0.61 0.95 0.09 0.19 2 0.77 0.90 0.72
Farrington 1 0.42 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.18 0.21 2 0.84 0.93 0.79
EWMA 1 0.58 0.97 0.67 0.96 0.14 0.22 2 0.76 0.90 0.70
Majority voting 1 0.56 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.10 0.17 2 0.78 0.91 0.73
Weighted majority
voting
1 0.53 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.13 0.22 2 0.77 0.89 0.71
Logistic regression 1 0.59 0.99 0.92 0.96 0.09 0.16 2 0.84 0.94 0.80
CARTa 1 0.56 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.12 0.19 2 0.83 0.92 0.78
Bayesian Networks 1 0.56 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.12 0.19 2 0.90 0.93 0.84
Quasi-null SND: scenario with a SND = −1.4
CUSUM 1 0.61 1.00 0.93 0.96 0.49 0.38 5 0.86 0.88 0.77
C1 1 0.17 0.99 0.64 0.92 0.24 0.27 4 0.55 0.89 0.53
C2 1 0.28 0.99 0.75 0.93 0.24 0.26 4 0.61 0.89 0.58
C3 1 0.39 0.97 0.56 0.94 0.36 0.31 5 0.72 0.86 0.66
Farrington 1 0.27 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.35 0.34 4 0.80 0.91 0.74
EWMA 1 0.51 0.94 0.46 0.95 0.20 0.24 4 0.76 0.90 0.70
Majority voting 1 0.42 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.25 0.28 4 0.71 0.86 0.65
Weighted majority
voting
1 0.38 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.34 0.33 4 0.50 0.50 0.50
Logistic regression 1 0.70 0.99 0.93 0.97 0.22 0.27 4 0.86 0.88 0.77
CARTa 1 0.68 1.00 0.93 0.97 0.25 0.27 4 0.84 0.86 0.75
Bayesian Networks 1 0.70 0.99 0.94 0.97 0.23 0.27 4 0.86 0.88 0.77
Negative SND: scenario with a SND = −89.2
CUSUM 0.29 0.03 1.00 0.96 0.91 0.87 0.77 11 0.65 0.82 0.59
C1 0.51 0.05 0.99 0.25 0.91 0.73 0.64 5 0.52 0.86 0.49
C2 0.60 0.07 0.98 0.30 0.91 0.70 0.60 5 0.55 0.86 0.51
C3 0.78 0.16 0.96 0.27 0.92 0.62 0.50 6 0.59 0.82 0.54
Farrington 0.67 0.09 0.99 0.46 0.92 0.64 0.55 5 0.60 0.87 0.56
EWMA 0.98 0.18 0.95 0.25 0.92 0.47 0.37 5 0.59 0.87 0.54
Majority voting 0.60 0.07 0.99 0.45 0.92 0.71 0.61 5 0.53 0.69 0.51
Weighted majority
voting
0.53 0.06 1.00 0.69 0.91 0.75 0.65 5 0.55 0.72 0.52
Logistic regression 0.29 0.03 1.00 0.96 0.91 0.87 0.77 11 0.60 0.81 0.55
CARTa 0.29 0.03 1.00 0.96 0.91 0.87 0.77 11 0.59 0.77 0.54
Bayesian Networks 0.51 0.06 1.00 0.96 0.91 0.80 0.68 7 0.60 0.81 0.55
aCART Classification and Regression Trees, PPV Positive Predictive Values, NPV Negative Predictive Values, AUC Area Under the ROC (Receiver Operating
Characteristic) Curve, Cases required proportion of cases needed for outbreak detection, Proportion of delay = 1 – timeliness score, that is: 1- (sum of time to
detection) / outbreak duration, AMOC Activity Monitor Operating Characteristic, AUWROC Area Under Weighted ROC. Positive SND: scenario generated with a daily
incidence of 1 for the baseline and an outbreak magnitude of 100 (SND = 65.4), Quasi-null SND scenario generated with an daily incidence of 1 for the baseline
and an outbreak magnitude of 30 (SND = −1.4), Negative SND scenario generated with a daily incidence of 3 for the baseline and an outbreak magnitude of
10 (SND = −8)
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Logistic regression
In the logistic regression method, the logit provides an
estimated probability of an outbreak. In our experiment,
we used the theoretical optimal threshold of 0.5 as the
decision rule, as suggested by Verlinde [45], to confirm
or invalidate the alarm. But, decision threshold fixed at
0.5 should be adjusted to improve sensitivity, specificity
and predictive value by using another experimentally-de-
termined threshold [46].
As explained in Verlinde, one advantage of logistic
regression is the possibility to consider ßi parameters as
direct measure of the relative importance of an ODA. It
minimized the total error rate, (combining with the same
weight, false alarm rate and false negative rate) with a
low rate of false alarms (0.0%) compared with decision
tree (0.3%) and majority voting (3.2%), but a higher rate
of false negative days (2.7%) compared with decision tree
(7.7%) and majority voting (0.0%). Verlinde, Altmann
also considered logistic regression to be the best
meta-classifier [47] according to the AUC and accuracy
criteria. According to these authors, logistic regression is
useful when the different experts show significant
differences in terms of accuracy and is also considered a
robust method.
Cart
Like logistic regression, CART can be used for ODA se-
lection and ranking by identifying the most important
sensors (near the root node). Because CART makes no
assumption about the underlying distribution, this point
can be considered an advantage, in comparison with
logistic regression models, particularly when the data are
far from the (multivariate) normal distribution [34].
However, we agree with several authors in finding that
tree structure learned from data is very sensitive to a
small change in the training data set and provides very
different splits, ultimately making interpretation some-
what precarious [35, 48]. And according to the type of
dataset, a change in the split criteria can lead to the
creation of very different trees. In addition, the different
threshold parameters of the rpart algorithm did not
allow us to improve prediction performance, especially in
the datasets with a very low SND. According to the litera-
ture, the major reason for this instability is the hierarchical
nature of the process: The effect of an error in the top
split is propagated down to all of the splits below it. The
performance of CART was consistently good, but slightly
below that of the regression models and BN, and was al-
ways more accurate than voting scheme methods. The dif-
ficulty in identifying the right settings remains a problem.
Bayesian network
Our evaluation results show that, whatever the out-
breaks and baseline characteristics, logistic regression
and the Bayesian Networks were able to achieve detection
with high accuracy (AUC= 0.70 – Table 1), which is simi-
lar to the best algorithm performance (AUC= 0.73). The
ROC curve comparison for the prediction of “detection”
presented in Fig. 1 shows that DFM with a training step
performs as well as the best ODA (CUSUM: AUC= 0.73).
Considering that an NPV around 0.93 was found for
all methods (ODA and DFM), we observed a major gain
(77%) in terms of positive predictive values (PPV) by
using DFMs (BN, logistic regression and CART
methods: PPV around 90%) compared to the best ODA
(Farrington: PPV = 51%), which also requires a 5-year
training period.
Bayesian methods are less reliant on specific asymp-
totic results, a property that can be a hindrance when
employing frequentist methods in small sample contexts
[49]. Another advantage of a Bayesian model is that
there is no a priori hypothesis about the nature of the
modeled relationships [50]. Like other DF “learning”
methods we noticed that, occasionally, BN depends on
the learning step, making this method sensitive to that
step. Another advantage of BN models is their capacity
to enrich their “surveillance knowledge” from new cases
to update their probability tables even if the surveillance
practices may change over time. This continuous train-
ing [47] enables the model to be updated and its predict-
ive quality to be improved, allowing outbreak detection
to be tailored to each surveillance system.
Using decision fusion for real time detection
Provided that the BN graph was adapted to the surveil-
lance dataset, tools like NETICA© make it possible to
visualize and calculate the conditional probability associ-
ated with each real-time ODA decision (Additional file 1:
Table S1). Unlike other decision fusion methods, this dy-
namic tool also makes it possible to take into account
the order in which results appear. For example, during
the structured learning step of our experiment with our
dataset based on a baseline at 1 and a signal at 30 for a
real outbreak day, we identified three algorithms of
interest: CUSUM, EWMA, and C3. We observed that
when the CUSUM ODA triggers an alarm alone, while
all the other ODAs remain silent, the probability of an
outbreak is estimated at 81.0%. It grows to 96.8% if the
second alarm is produced by EWMA and to 98.7% if the
third is produced by C3. Results are modified as follows
if the alarm sequence is EWMA/CUSUM/C3: 5.4, 96.8,
98.7%. However, if we take into account a new alarm
(the fourth) triggered by an ODA with a non-significant
link to the outbreak status, for example in this case the
C1 algorithm, the probability falls to 50%, showing the
importance of the training period for methods for which
contributing ODAs need to be selected.
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We agree with Jafarpour [22] that inference per-
formed using a BN can help to develop what-if
analyses in disease surveillance activity or to identify
an efficient ODA configuration and combination given
the desired level of detection performance. This type
of tool provides insight into the features of detection
methods that are important to optimize to obtain
better detection.
Decision fusion: benefits and limitations
In this study, we try to quantify the value of decision
fusion (proof-of concept) in disease surveillance by
using a simulated dataset standardized (allowing re-
producible evaluation). The choice to use 20 years’
period was only driven by sample size constraints re-
quired for statistical precision in our study. This level
of background information would not be required for
routine implementation. This period is an extreme
situation because in the real life of surveillance, mea-
surements and ecology of diseases are not consistent
over the 20 years.
A number of extensions to this work may also im-
prove the generalization of our study. First, we sug-
gest before implementation to consider other kinds of
outbreak curves in addition to our Norovirus out-
break. However, we have known since Buckeridge and
Jackson [4, 5] that ODA performance results are in-
fluenced by curve shape. Our results were also af-
fected by the quality of the training period for models
requiring that step. In the absence of historical data
or a realistic (for the population under surveillance)
simulated dataset, we need to clarify and compare
more precisely the use of a single ODA versus a deci-
sion fusion tool. That is why, before putting them
into routine use, we advise epidemiologists to validate
their decision fusion models in their own context of
use, with their own data and especially by testing the
different diseases habitually faced by their system.
As expected [7], the most informative determinants
of detection performance was SND, which is a param-
eter combining the baseline levels and the peak size
of the outbreak. However, one limitation in compar-
ing surveillance and DF methods is the difficulty in
choosing the evaluation metric to optimize. Indeed,
and according to the aim and context of surveillance,
people in charge of surveillance systems need to
optimize either the PPV, the NPV, the timeliness, or a
mix of these metrics (AUWROC, AMOC, etc.). This
limitation was addressed in our work by proposing
different evaluation metrics and surveillance circum-
stances (surveillance scenario).
Our results are a contribution to the fact that decision
fusion models can decrease the risk of using a single in-
appropriate ODA. Indeed, this approach does not
require the prior choice of an ODA, which could be
unsuitable for a specific context. In this sense, choosing
to use decision fusion is a way to control the risk of
ODA misspecification and limitation. In most cases, a
decision fusion model outperforms a single algorithm.
These results support the conceptual framework of Diet-
terich’s reasons (statistical, computational, and represen-
tational) [19], that justify why multiple classifiers may
work better than a single one.
Use of synthetic data in this work is only driven by
our focus on reproducible assessments of performance
across the different DF approaches. An in-depth applica-
tion to real surveillance data is beyond the aim of this
paper. But before any deployment of decision methods,
in a real disease surveillance system using several algo-
rithms on the same data, a confirmation step should be
considered.
This work can be extended by including more fusion
decision methods such as Dempster-Shaffer, fuzzy logic,
Neural Network [28] /Deep Learning or by using the
framework of decision spaces [51].
Conclusions
Finally, our paper illustrates the fact that a good decision
fusion method (as BN, logistic regression, or CART) is
in our experiment at least equivalent to the best algo-
rithm in terms of compromise between an early warning
and the probability that the alarm triggered is a false
alarm, whatever the situation being faced by the system,
without the drawback of betting on the future. So, we
recommend a decision fusion model based on a Bayesian
Network approach to identify disease outbreaks in sys-
tems using several ODAs to analyze surveillance data.
This conclusion doesn’t take into consideration other
characteristics of surveillance system especially it’s stabil-
ity, it’s human involvement and it’s resulting timeliness.
Numerous tools in the field of Bayesian Networks
offer as an output a probability of outbreak presence/
absence, thus making it possible to evaluate and re-
adjust the decision threshold and real-time forecast.
For those less familiar with this kind of technique, we
suggest using logistic regression when a learning data-
set is available. Otherwise, with a positive SND, a voting
scheme technique can be considered in this specific
circumstance.
In the future and once their parameters have been set,
these statistical techniques could be integrated in decision
support systems which will aim at providing assistance to
expert decision making strategies during daily outbreak
surveillance activities [52]. The major issues and chal-
lenges of such tools and techniques will be their adequacy
to decision-related activities of these experts in outbreak
context, described as real-setting, time-constrained, com-
plex and uncertain situations [53, 54].
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Additional file
Additional file 1: Table S1. An example of 25 years of dataset (training
dataset the first 5 years + evaluation dataset the next 20 years) used in
this study to evaluate outbreak detection algorithm and decision fusion
methods (Baseline = 3 cases by days in average, Total number of
outbreak cases injected =50 cases). The baseline (Column A) level of
disease surveillance corresponding to an average of 3 cases declared by
days in the system and the complete outbreak signal corresponding to a
total of 50 cases according a shape of Norovirus outbreak injected
(Column B) several time in the baseline. Column C represents the first
day of the outbreak (1 = Start of the outbreak) and Column D all days
considered as epidemic (=1). (XLSX 195 kb)
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DFM: Decision fusion methods; NPV: Negative predictive value;
ODA: Outbreak detection algorithm; PPV: Positive predictive value;
Se: Sensitivity; SND: Signal-to-noise difference; Sp: Specificity
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